Precision agriculture is an act of faith—trusting data, sensors, and algorithms to act as extensions of human intent.
FarmCore and FarmLytics were designed for efficiency, not exploitation. What follows illustrates how their interaction should have worked—until trust itself became the point of attack.
These diagrams are reconstructions, not warnings. They show the hinge where design met assumption.
FarmCore ↔ FarmLytics Overview
flowchart LR
%% Edge
subgraph E[Edge - Greenhouse or Grow Room]
SENS[Sensor Array - Temp RH CO2 PAR PPFD pH EC]
ACT[Actuators - LED arrays Pumps HVAC Fans]
SK[FarmCore Safety Kernel - local limits and simulation]
end
%% Site
subgraph SITE[Site Layer]
GWS[Site Gateway - data buffer and time sync]
LOG[Immutable Log - signed entries]
end
%% Cloud
subgraph CLOUD[Cloud - FarmLytics]
ING[Ingestion and Storage]
ML[Models and Optimization - recipe generator]
CA[Certificate and Policy Service]
end
%% Flows
SENS --> GWS
GWS --> ING
ING --> ML
ML -->|proposed recipe| GWS
GWS --> SK
SK -->|shadow test and verify| ACT
CA -.->|mutual TLS and certs| GWS
CA -.->|policy updates| SK
SK --> LOG
GWS --> LOG
ING --> LOG
%% Styles
classDef edge fill:#12313d,stroke:#52ffa8,color:#e8eef5;
classDef site fill:#1a2430,stroke:#52ffa8,color:#e8eef5;
classDef cloud fill:#2b2016,stroke:#ffb35a,color:#e8eef5;
class SENS,ACT,SK edge;
class GWS,LOG site;
class ING,ML,CA cloud;
Compromised Feedback Loop
flowchart TB
subgraph CLOUD[FarmLytics Cloud]
ING[Ingestion]
ML[Model Train and Serve]
PKI[Compromised CA - spoofed certs]
end
subgraph SITE[Site Gateway]
GW[Gateway]
LOG[Immutable Log]
end
subgraph EDGE[Edge - FarmCore]
SK[Safety Kernel v1]
ACT[Actuators - LEDs and Nutrients]
SENS[Sensors]
end
SENS --> GW
GW --> ING
ING --> ML
ML -->|poisoned recipe| GW
PKI -.->|false trust| GW
GW --> SK
SK -->|shadow test passed - spoofed| ACT
ACT -->|environment change| SENS
SK --> LOG
GW --> LOG
ING --> LOG
%% Styles
classDef edge fill:#12313d,stroke:#52ffa8,color:#e8eef5;
classDef site fill:#1a2430,stroke:#52ffa8,color:#e8eef5;
classDef cloud fill:#2b2016,stroke:#ffb35a,color:#e8eef5;
class SENS,SK,ACT edge;
class GW,LOG site;
class ING,ML,PKI cloud;
%% Exploit path highlight
linkStyle 7 stroke:#ff4b3e,stroke-width:2px
linkStyle 8 stroke-dasharray:3 3,stroke:#ff4b3e
linkStyle 9 stroke:#ff4b3e,stroke-width:2px
linkStyle 10 stroke:#ff4b3e,stroke-width:2px
HMI / CEA Recipe Dashboard
Reconstructed interface view. Simulated data for educational context.
In 2010, a piece of code slipped through the world’s air gaps and rewrote how we think about control.
Stuxnet targeted Siemens industrial controllers at Iran’s Natanz facility, quietly varying centrifuge speeds while feeding normal data back to operators.
It was the first malware to cause physical destruction—proof that software could move steel.
To engineers, it was a revelation of possibility and responsibility. The systems behind Dark Recipe draw their lineage from that moment: a world where process automation and statecraft share the same syntax.
“We built it to keep the peace. We just forgot to teach it what peace meant.”