Threat Vectors
Attackers exploit both the software supply chain and edge trust boundaries. The notes below mirror the investigative threads followed by Knox Ramsey.
Attack Chain: Supply Chain to Public Exposure
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Target profiling, supplier mapping, and foothold via a single vendor relationship.
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Keys and certificates exposed through supplier systems and CI artifacts.
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Poisoned model weights and policy packages enter the update channel.
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Blue light spikes, nitrogen stress, and thermal oscillation encoded as "optimization".
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Edge controller accepts spoofed signals; Safety Kernel v1 fails to block.
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Biochemical defense cascades elevate toxins; crop quality silently degrades.
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Outbound logistics propagate contaminated batches beyond the facility boundary.
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8 Public Exposure — Poisonings, ER Overload CrisisHealth systems register spikes; investigations correlate distributed supply lots.
Attack Flow (Large Diagram)
flowchart LR
subgraph P1[Recon]
A["Initial Recon
Compromise 1 Vendor"] --> B["Credential Harvest
API / Cert Leakage"] end subgraph P2[Infiltration] C["FarmLytics Infiltration
Model Weight Tampering"] --> D["Recipe Manipulation
Light Spikes · N Stress · Temp Oscillation"] end subgraph P3[Execution] E["FarmCore Executes
Telemetry Trusted"] --> F["Plant Stress
Phenolic Aldehydes ↑"] end subgraph P4[Impact] G["Distribution Chain
Contaminated Flow"] end subgraph P5[Crisis] H["Public Exposure
Poisonings · ER Overload"] end B --> C D --> E F --> G G --> H classDef recon fill:#ffd4a3,stroke:#ff9d4d,stroke-width:2px,color:#1a1a1a classDef infiltrate fill:#ffb3b3,stroke:#ff6666,stroke-width:2px,color:#1a1a1a classDef execute fill:#d4b3ff,stroke:#9966ff,stroke-width:2px,color:#1a1a1a classDef impact fill:#ff9999,stroke:#ff4444,stroke-width:2px,color:#1a1a1a classDef crisis fill:#ff6666,stroke:#cc0000,stroke-width:3px,color:#fff class A,B,P1 recon class C,D,P2 infiltrate class E,F,P3 execute class G,P4 impact class H,P5 crisis
Compromise 1 Vendor"] --> B["Credential Harvest
API / Cert Leakage"] end subgraph P2[Infiltration] C["FarmLytics Infiltration
Model Weight Tampering"] --> D["Recipe Manipulation
Light Spikes · N Stress · Temp Oscillation"] end subgraph P3[Execution] E["FarmCore Executes
Telemetry Trusted"] --> F["Plant Stress
Phenolic Aldehydes ↑"] end subgraph P4[Impact] G["Distribution Chain
Contaminated Flow"] end subgraph P5[Crisis] H["Public Exposure
Poisonings · ER Overload"] end B --> C D --> E F --> G G --> H classDef recon fill:#ffd4a3,stroke:#ff9d4d,stroke-width:2px,color:#1a1a1a classDef infiltrate fill:#ffb3b3,stroke:#ff6666,stroke-width:2px,color:#1a1a1a classDef execute fill:#d4b3ff,stroke:#9966ff,stroke-width:2px,color:#1a1a1a classDef impact fill:#ff9999,stroke:#ff4444,stroke-width:2px,color:#1a1a1a classDef crisis fill:#ff6666,stroke:#cc0000,stroke-width:3px,color:#fff class A,B,P1 recon class C,D,P2 infiltrate class E,F,P3 execute class G,P4 impact class H,P5 crisis
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Supply Chain Compromise
Malicious model weights inserted before deployment. Configuration packages transit legitimate logistics, masking tampering.
- Poisoned training data targeting spectral optimization
- Signed firmware updated via trusted vendor portal
- Orchestrated to appear as a calibration patch
Credential & Certificate Spoofing
Attackers forge trust anchors to bypass advisory-only safeguards.
- Compromised certificate authority issues fraudulent edge certs
- Shadow PKI mimics FarmLytics policy updates
- Gateway accepts poisoned recipes as authentic
Closed-Loop Blind Spots
Safety Kernel v1 runs single-channel verification, allowing doctored telemetry to pass.
- Shadow test relies on spoofed sensor replay
- Logging occurs, but alerts are suppressed downstream
- Upgraded Kernel v2 introduces dual-channel physics checks
Incident Lessons
Stuxnet, the Ukraine power grid attacks, TRITON/TRISIS, Colonial Pipeline, and the JBS intrusion demonstrate that cyber-physical exploits escalate quickly. The Dark Recipe plot aligns with documented tactics but compresses the timeline for dramatic effect.